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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 One of the most discussed issue in last decade is whether financing public 
expenditures make difference to the level of aggregate demand given that government 
expenditures are fixed. 
 The analysis of effects of fiscal deficits or government debt outstanding on 
consumption brought in several controversial theoretical and statistical results.  Keynesian 
view implies that deficit financed tax-cuts raise disposable income, thereby stimulating 
aggregate demand.  Ricardian Equivalence states that substitution of debt for taxes, for a 
given government expenditures and a constant population, does not affect the resource 
allocation between private investment and consumption in the economy. Individuals with 
rational expectations, according to Ricardian Equivalence, fully discount their increased tax 
liabilities. Therefore this equivalence is also known as "tax discounting hypothesis". If this 
hypothesis is true, an increased budget deficit or government debt outstanding created 
entirely by a current tax cut has literally no effect on interest rates, private investment and 
savings. Therefore government should realize that people with rational expectations will 
foresee the current and future government fiscal activities, hence should not have a policy 
of  substitution of debt for taxes to change level of macro variables. 
 The purpose of this study is to investigate the assumptions and evidence of   
Ricardian Equivalence model. The plan of this study as follows. Section II explains the 
assumptions of and critiques to  the Ricardian Equivalence. Section III gives the several 
empirical evidence from the econometric models in testing the Ricardian Equivalence that 
give controversial statistical implications. 
 
II. EVALUATION OF THE MODEL 
 
                                                 
* This paper is mainly a part of author's Ph.D. dissertation," Testing the Ricardian Equivalence 
Theorem in the Framework of the Permanent Income Hypothesis," published by UMI, A Bell & 
Howell Information Company (No:  9732895), MI, USA, 1997. 
** Dr., Erciyes University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Dept. of Economics. 
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 The term of Ricardian Equivalence comes from the statement that whether 
government taxes or borrows, the effect is the same, given that government expenditures 
are fixed. Today's borrowing will result in an increase in future taxes and the present value 
of borrowing of the government (present value of increase in future taxes) is equal to the 
increase in disposable income due to the tax cut. Therefore an infinitely-lived rational 
consumer does not consider government bonds to be part of "net wealth".
1
 Hence the 
individual will have this expectation of "equivalence": 
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 Therefore consumption will be unchanged as a result of a tax cut, with given 
government expenditures. In order for this argument to hold, Ricardian Equivalence 
assumes that 
 1- The economy contains a representative individual with an infinite horizon. 
 2- Individuals borrow and lend at the same real interest rate as the government. 
 3- Future taxes are perfectly foreseen. 
 4- Taxes are lump sum. 
 5- Government expenditures are given.
2
  
  Robert Barro (1974, 1987 and 1989), a leading New Classical Economist, 
reintroduced Ricardo’s (1951) idea in modern terms. Barro claims that an infinite-lived 
representative consumer can readjust his/her current consumption behavior by looking at 
outcomes of the government’s current actions. For instance, if government runs a larger 
deficit by cutting current taxes, the consumer increases his/her saving, because today’s tax 
cut generates an increase in the present value of future taxes. National saving remains the 
same, since an increase in private saving offsets the decrease in government saving. 
Therefore, in this analysis, a tax cut will not affect the consumption path, national saving 
and, hence, interest rates.  
  There are some objections to Ricardian Equivalence which can be summarized as 
follows: 
 1. Finite-lived consumers rather than infinitely-lived consumers. If the tax burden 
falls far in the future, then the present value of future taxes may be smaller than the increase 
in disposable income caused by a tax cut. This may motivate an increase in consumption. 
  Barro asserts that this argument may not hold true if the consumers take care of their 
children by leaving bequests for them. If parents have an altruistic behavior, they  can leave 
their wealth  to their children so that the budget constraint is not based on  only one 
lifetime. Any increase in income because of a tax cut, hence, can be bequeathed to younger 
generations. As a result of bequests, then finite lives could convert  to infinitive lives. This 
result, of course, is not realistic but rather an analytical convenience that has been 
commonly accepted as a tool in analyses that use the budget constraints. 
                                                 
1
 Barro (1974). 
2 Barro   (1989). 
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 2. Liquidity constraints. In some cases consumers would like to spend more now, 
based on their future income, but they cannot  reach this consumption level because of 
liquidity constraints or imperfections in financial markets. If the loan markets are imperfect, 
consumers who have liquidity constraints are not able to borrow to meet their consumption 
demand.
3
  
 Barro’s answer is that there might be two groups. The first group, mostly large 
businesses, might have access to credit markets; whereas the second group consists of 
households and relatively low income consumers who do not have such access. The second 
group pays a higher interest rate, since loans to these people involve higher transaction 
costs. Then second group's discount rate is equal to its marginal borrowing rate, since its 
members equate their marginal rate of return on investment to their discount rate. An 
interest rate higher than the discount rate postpones today's consumption whereas a  
discount rate higher than the interest rate gives more weight to today's consumption. The 
government borrowing rate is equal to that of the first group, since together they dominate 
the credit market. Further, assume that the share of tax cut and future tax liabilities between 
the first and second group is equal. Since the second group's discount rate exceeds the 
interest rate, the present value of future tax liabilities (due to tax cut) of this group falls 
short of their share of tax cut. Therefore with a tax cut the second group increases its 
consumption. As its consumption increases, its discount rate (the marginal borrowing rate) 
will tend to decrease.
4
 Therefore the second group will increase its demand for credit.  
 Hence, Barro states that a government issue of public debt can be a useful form of 
financial intermediation. The government can induce the first group to hold more than its 
share of the public debt. The second group, thus, holds less debt than its share and they 
obtain a kind of credit or loan from the first group after an increase in the second group's  
demand for investment. Thus loans between the first and second groups take place, 
although credit markets are imperfect. 
 3. Uncertainty. Martin Feldstein (1976) shows that when households are unsure 
about their future income levels, or because of the complexity in estimating the future tax 
liabilities, a current tax cut might result in an increase in  consumption. Barro's answer
5
 is 
that a deficit-financed tax cut does not have a real macro effect. In an economy with perfect 
credit markets, consumers want to hold extra debt, because they consider this extra debt as 
a perfect guarantee against the uncertainties of future taxes on incomes. 
 4. If taxes are not lump-sump. Andrew Abel (1986) points out that future taxes on 
capital income rather than labor income or progressive taxes on bequests induce consumers 
to increase their consumption. Ricardian Equivalence holds only if taxes are not distorting. 
A distorting tax can change the preference between working and leisure time by changing 
their relative prices. Therefore changes in marginal tax rates on income or on capital or any 
other form of taxes rather than lump-sum taxes are very likely to undermine Ricardian 
Equivalence.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Willem Buiter and James Tobin (1979). 
4 The first order conditions for optimization imply that the expected consumption exceeds 
the current consumption as long as the interest rate exceeds the discount rate. 
5 Barro (1989, pp. 214 - 215). See also Chan (1983). 
  
4 
 
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 There are several studies that call the Ricardian Equivalence into question. Martin  
Feldstein (1982) tests he effects of USA tax policy on consumption during the period 1930-
1977. 
 C b b Y b W b SSW b Gt t t t t    0 1 2 3 4  
                           + b T b TR b Dt t t5 6 7  + ut  (2)  
 Where C is total consumption expenditure, Y is current income, W is the privately 
owned wealth, SSW is social security benefits, G is government expenditures, T is Total tax 
revenues, TR is transfers, D is  Government debt. Ricardian Equivalence in this model 
implies five null hypotheses; b4 < 0, b5 = 0, b6 = 0, b3 = 0, and b2 = b7. He rejects the only 
first and third restrictions and is able to reject the second restriction only at 20 percent level. 
He concludes that a tax cut results in an increase in consumption, provided government 
expenditures are fixed, yet his statistical result in terms of  second restriction does not reject 
the Ricardian Equivalence at conventional significance level. Therefore his statistical 
rejection of Ricardian Equivalence is controversial.  
 Lawrence Summers and James Poterba (1987) study the effects of tax changes of 
1964, 1968, 1975 and 1981 on consumption behavior. He runs a test by the following 
equation for the period 1947:1- 1986:3 for USA. 
 Ct = 0 + 1Ct-1 + 2Tax64t + Tax68t   
                       + Tax75t +    Tax81t  + ut            (3)  
 Where C is consumption ( Non-durable consumption, consumption of services and 
total consumption), Tax64t  is tax cut in 1964, Tax68t  is tax shock due to Vietnam War, 
Tax75t is tax rebate in 1975, Tax81t  is tax cut during Reagan  administration. He finds 
statistically significant and positive coefficients from the equation indicating that 
consumption changes when tax collection changes. Therefore the estimation results are 
against Ricardian Equivalence.   
 B. Douglas Bernheim (1987) uses a broad empirical consumption function to study 
macro effects of the fiscal variables on the level of consumption. He shows the existence of 
a close relationship between the deficit and aggregate consumption. He summarizes some 
studies that use data mainly for the USA, and finds that a deficit gives rise to a consumption 
increase of $0.20 to $0.50 for every dollar of deficit increase. The regression he ran is 
 
   C a a Y T a T G rD
        +a G a D a W a X   e
t t t t t t
t t t t t
     
   
0 1 2
3 4 5 6 ,
          (4)  
where Ct is consumption, Yt is national income, Tt is tax revenues, Gt is government 
spending, Dt is debt, Wt is private wealth, r is the interest rate, Xt is a vector of other 
exogenous variables at time t, and  e is the stochastic error term. All variables are in 
aggregate levels. The first term is disposable income, the second is the government surplus. 
The null hypothesis is  1 2 ,which would hold under Ricardian Equivalence. In his 
cross-country analysis of several developed and developing countries, Bernheim finds 
statistically significant effects of deficits on consumption. By taking 12 and 6 year averages 
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(1972-1983) for each country and running cross-sectional regressions he finds that a $1 
deficit-financed  tax cut causes an increase in aggregate consumption of $0.33 to $0.44. 
This result is also against Ricardian Equivalence. 
 Seator and Mariona (1985) include a permanent income variable in their 
consumption equation  
 C b b Y b Y Y b G b G Gt t
p
t t
p
t
p
t t
p      0 1 2 3 4( ) ( )  
                 + b AMTR b RS b RL b T b TRt t t t5 6 7 8 9     
                            +b D b SSW ut t t10 11   (5)  
where Ct is real per capita consumption, Yt
p
 is permanent income, Yt  is current income, 
Gt
p  
is permanent government expenditures, Gt is current government expenditures, RSt and 
RLt are short and long term after-tax interest rates, AMTRt  is the average marginal tax rate, 
Tt tax collections, Dt is the market value of government debt, TRt is transfers and SSWt is the 
social security wealth at time t. All variables are measured in real per capita values. The 
sample period is  1929 - 1975 (for USA). 
 They proxy permanent income Yt
p   
with the normal level of income. Normal levels 
of income are the stochastic steady state values of real GNP (Yt) computed from an  
ARIMA model for Yt.  Transitory income is calculated as the difference between real GNP 
and the permanent income, Yt - Y
p
t.
 
 Expected signs of the coefficients are b8<0<b9, b10, b11 and these fiscal variables are 
expected to be jointly insignificant on consumption. They find that the coefficients on T, 
TR, D and SSW are jointly and individually equal to zero. This finding supports the 
Ricardian Equivalence. Their explanation for sensitivity of consumption to temporary 
income is the liquidity constraint. If there is a liquidity constraint, individuals who face it 
would be able to increase their consumption if government reduced current taxes and raised 
future taxes. But this also implies failure of Ricardian Equivalence. Their results are, 
however, consistent with Ricardian Equivalence by finding insignificant effects of fiscal 
variables on consumption. Although they use permanent components of income and 
government expenditures, they take into account only the current values of these fiscal 
variables tax revenue, transfers, debt, social security wealth in testing the Ricardian 
Equivalence. Besides, the main criticism of studies indicated above is that they do not take 
into account intertemporal utility maximization and rational expectations. Results from a 
consumption function that does not use expectations can not be consistent with the 
individuals utility functions that are maximized with respect to their budget constraints. 
 These test results have been controversial in terms  of either statistical results or 
different theoretical and econometric models applied to the consumption  function. In 
testing Ricardian Equivalence, one can conduct relatively more efficient econometric model 
that employs both current and lagged values of fiscal variables and income with zero 
innovations. The important point is to see whether effects of tax, government debt and 
income on consumption come from innovations or predicted parts of these variables. 
Therefore Ricardian Equivalence can be tested by an equation below take takes into rational 
expectations and both employs current and lagged predicted values of the variables. 
             Ct =  k +  + 11Yt + 12LYt  + 13L
2Yt +14L
3Yt 
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              + 21Tt + 22LTt + 23L
2Tt +24L
3Tt 
                             +31Bt + 32LBt + 33L
2Bt + 34L
3Bt + nt        (6)       
   stands for revisions in future income (Y), bonds (B) and taxes (T) due to 
innovations in current variables and L is lag operator. Dynamic multipliers that can be 
obtained from a moving average representation of a VAR of order four are the unexpected 
parts or innovations in these variables. Ricardian Equivalence implies that 21  and 31 are 
jointly equal to zero.  
Ct = b+ 11 ( a11 -1)L + a12L
2
 + a13L
3
 + a14L
4
 ) Yt  
 + (b11L+b12L+ b13L
3
 + b14L
4
 )Tt + (c11L + c12L
2
 + c13L
3
 + c14L
4
 ) Bt  
          + 12LYt  + 13L
2Yt + 14L
3Yt 
        + 21 ( a21L + a22L
2
 + a23L
3
 + a24L
4
 )Yt  
        + (b21-1)L+b22L
2
+b23L
3
 +b24L
4
 )Tt+ ( c21L+ c22L
2
 + c23L
3
 + c24L
4
)Bt  
        + 22LTt + 23L
2Tt  + 24L
3Tt 
 + 31( a31L + a32L
2
 + a33L
3
 + a34L
4
 ) Yt  
      +( b31L+ b32L
2
+ b33L
3
+ b34L
4
) Tt+ ( c31 -1)L + c32L
2
 + c33L
3
 + c34L
4
) Bt   
   + 32LBt  + 33L
2Bt + 34L
3Bt    
       + vt             (7)                                                                                                                                                                     
 where   b = k + 11 m1 +  21 m2  + 31 m3 
    and      vt =    + nt  + 11 u1t +21 u2t + 31 u3t  
 The  m1,  m2, m3  (constants) and   u1t, u2t,  u3t (innovations) are obtained from the VAR 
system of order four. The problem with this test in eq.(6) is that  Ct  might respond to 
innovations rather than the predicted parts in L
0Yt, L
0Tt, L
0B. Then such a response 
could be interpreted as failure of Ricardian Equivalence. This, however, would be wrong 
interpretation. Therefore, in testing equivalence using data for USA, UK and Turkey for 
period 1970-1993, I will first decompose L
0Yt, L
0Tt, L
0B into innovations and predicted 
parts by using the a VAR system of order four, and then use only predicted parts in which 
innovations are zero in eq.(7) above. Considering eq.(7) as an unrestricted system, I then 
run excess sensitivity test as follows: 
Ct = b +11 ( a11 -1)L + a12L
2
 + a13L
3
 + a14L
4
 ) Yt  
               +( b11L + b12L
2
 + b13L
3
 + b14L
4
)Tt + ( c11L + c12L
2
 + c13L
3
 + c14L
4
 )Bt   
              + 12LYt  + 13L
2Yt + 14L
3Yt  + vt      (8)  
 The degrees of freedom and the levels of significance are in parenthesis in the table. 
The null hypothesis is that   H0: 21 = 22 = 23 = 24 = 31 =  32 = 33 = 34 = 0, in eq.(8). 
The F statistic results given by table below indicate that the null hypothesis is accepted for 
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Turkey, UK and the USA at 0.05 level. Therefore Ricardian Equivalence holds in all three 
cases. 
 
 Turkey UK USA 
 F(8,7)  0.575 F(8,7)   0.428 F(8,5)    0.488 
 (0.772) (0.870) (0.824) 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ricardian Equivalence states that the choice between tax-cuts and debt finance have 
no effect on resource allocation between private investment and consumption in the 
economy, for given government expenditures. 
 Studies of this statement yield controversial results. This controversy may arise due 
to simply the fact that the testing models employ different variables. In testing the 
equivalence, the data or sample period by itself may cause statistical rejection (acceptance) 
at a certain level of significance, although theory is correct (wrong). Or failure of Ricardian 
Equivalence may originate in structure of economies under study, i.e., imperfect credit 
markets. The result from a model that uses both contemporaneous and lagged values of 
variables indicates that Ricardian Equivalence holds. If this statistical result is true, 
government deficits or debt outstanding due to tax-cuts are irrelevant to alter the levels of 
investment, savings and aggregate demand, for given government expenditures. 
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